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Abstract
As a platform to facilitate information sharing, business-to-business (B2B) electronic markets allow 
buyers and sellers to conduct transactions in a digital environment with greater information 
transparency. Vertical information transparency about demand has been shown to be beneficial to supply 
chain management. Thus, information technology (EDI, B2B e-markets) is believed to offer great benefits. 
Yet, the literature generally assumes that either the downstream firm (retailer) or upstream firm 
(manufacturer) is a monopoly. Little is known whether this is still the case if both sides face competition. 
Built on the existing literature, this paper develops a simple two-level e-market model with upstream and 
downstream competition to study the effects of information transparency. We find that information 
transparency enabled by electronic markets can create value for the whole supply chain, yet it affects 
retailers and manufacturers very differently: one side will be hurt, depending on the competition mode 
(Cournot or Bertrand) in the downstream industry. Unfortunately, it never unanimously benefits the two 
sides; conflict of interest persists. Then, the theoretical benefits of information transparency recognized in 
the literature will not materialize. It illustrates a fundamental challenge with electronic markets and 
offers a possible explanation to the difficulty faced by many B2B e-markets. To deal with this issue, we 
propose a discriminatory pricing scheme for the e-market operator to internalize informational benefits 
among retailers and manufacturers so that the online market mechanism can be sustainable.
Key words: Electronic markets, competition, information transparency, IT-enabled supply chains.
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1. Introduction
Information sharing has been shown to benefit supply chain management in academic literature. In reality, many 
industries are still in search of a platform that would facilitate information sharing while conducting transactions. As 
one such IT-enabled transaction platform and information hub (Lee and Whang 2000), business-to-business (B2B) 
electronic markets (e-markets) have been shown to increase information transparency (Zhu 2004). Here information 
transparency refers to a high degree of visibility and accessibility of information. For example, e-markets provide a 
digital environment with abundant data about products, prices, bids, trader information, and other transaction details. 
Hence, relative to traditional physical markets, electronic markets offer an information-rich environment (Kalvenes 
& Basu 2006). Along this line, infomediary is modeled as a key feature of B2B markets (Bhargava & Choudhary 
2004).
It is widely believed that information transparency benefits the total supply chain (e.g., Lee et al. 2000, Cachon and 
Fisher 2000), but information transparency in the supply chain literature generally refers to vertical information 
sharing about demand or inventory between an upstream firm (e.g., a manufacturer) and a downstream firm (e.g., a 
retailer), not horizontal information sharing between competitors. Recent studies show that horizontal information 
transparency in B2B e-market enables firms to use transaction data to infer the cost structure of competitors (Soh et. 
al. 2006). 
Transaction data is generally considered as sensitive and private information of e-market participants. So B2B e-
market operator should provide an option of revealing transaction information to participants if they want to protect 
their information privacy (Kalvenes & Basu 2006). On the other hand, information transparency is also deemed 
socially desirable because it generally believed to lead to more efficiency in resource allocation. If this intuition is 
true, it is still not clear whether the major benefits of information transparency are captured by end consumers or by 
B2B e-market participants. Prior economics literature (e.g. Gal-Or 1985) has shown that information sharing in a 
one-level market could intensify the competition or help competitors to coordinate their competing strategies. But 
the effects of information transparency about cost in a two-level B2B e-market remain unanswered. Motivated by 
these issues, we focus on the following research questions:
• About the value of information transparency, does it benefit the whole B2B e-market (such that the operator 
would find this worthwhile to pursue)?
• Does information transparency have the same effect on upstream sellers and downstream buyers, or will there 
be a conflict of interest? 
• How to manage information transparency in B2B e-markets to make all participants better off?
The real world offers examples on both sides. For instance, Covisint provided a transparent platform on which 
information such as traders and prices was visible to all participants (Raisinghani and Hanebeck 2002). The auto-
manufacturers used Covisint to find suppliers, but they conducted transactions offline partly due to the concern that 
their cost structures would be known by competitors (Day et al. 2003). It turned out that Covisint’s transparent 
model did not work. In 2004, Covisint was sold to FreeMarkets (itself bought by Ariba) (Forbes 2004).
The fall of Covisint, along with many other public B2B exchanges, does not signify the end of transparent 
marketplaces. In fact, despite all the backslash about B2B exchanges, evidence shows that B2B transaction volumes 
are going up significantly: $98 billion in 2006, a 24% growth over $79 billion in 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). 
Regarding the information transparency, another B2B exchange, Alibaba, tells a story different from Covisint. The 
transaction data are publicly visible on Alibaba.com. It even provides historical data of closed transactions to 
participants. The transaction volume on Alibaba has been growing steadily (Forbes 2004). As another example, 
WorldWide Retail Exchange (WWRE) has two e-market structures with different levels of information 
transparency. First, WWRE’s data pool service provides up-to-date and searchable information, with an objective 
“to develop a single platform that connects retailers, manufacturers, and their business trading partners to more 
efficiently and effectively share information and manage work processes” (WWRE 2005). Second, WWRE also 
provides private exchanges to those firms who want to customize their information exchange with selected suppliers 
and customers, and want to have better control over transaction data and privacy. 
These examples illustrate that although information transparency is one of the major concerns of B2B e-market 
participants, the transparent B2B e-market model can be successful in practice. But there are examples of 
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unsuccessful transparent B2B e-markets. A natural question is how to explain this phenomenon in practice. To 
answer this question, we need to understand whether the failure of some transparent B2B e-markets is caused by 
information transparency itself, or by mismanagement of information transparency. Answers to this question can 
generate useful insights into the role of information transparency in B2B e-markets and the optimal design of B2B e-
markets.
To better understand these issues, we develop a simple model of a B2B e-market for a two-level supply chain. There 
are two buyers (retailers) in the downstream with each having two pre-qualified manufacturers in the upstream 
(which is later expanded to more retailers and manufacturers). Manufacturers compete for the retailer’s demand via 
bidding on the e-market platform; then retailers compete in the end-consumer market. 
Using this simple setting, we show that information transparency affects retailers and manufacturers very differently. 
We find that it is always the case that one side (either retailers or manufacturers) will be hurt by, while the other side 
benefits from, the information transparency enabled by the e-market. Interestingly, the competition mode of the 
downstream industry turns out to be the critical factor that determines which side will be hurt. If retailers compete 
on quantity (i.e., Cournot competition), information transparency helps them but hurts their upstream manufacturers. 
Conversely, if the retailers compete on price (i.e., Bertrand competition), retailers will be hurt while manufacturers 
will benefit. Unfortunately, we find that, in our research setting, information transparency never unanimously 
benefits the two sides; conflict of interest persists. Those who are hurt will be reluctant to participate in the 
transparent marketplace. The theoretical benefits of information sharing recognized in the literature will not 
materialize. This illustrates a fundamental challenge with information transparency in B2B e-markets.
Despite the conflict of interest, we find that information transparency always increases the overall welfare to e-
market participants regardless of the competition mode, implying that the benefits generated by the information 
transparency always dominate the losses. To encourage information sharing, several studies in the literature 
proposed contract schemes (e.g., Cachon 2003, Corbett et al. 2004). We propose an alternative approach, namely, an 
electronic market uses a discriminatory pricing scheme to internalize the informational benefits between retailers 
and manufacturers so that both sides are better off. Comparing to the one-to-one contract scheme, our market-based 
coordination mechanism is more appropriate for a supply chain setting where many players are involved and 
affected.
Literature Review
This paper is built on a body of work in the information systems literature. The field has shown a steady interest in 
electronic marketplaces, interorganizational systems, and electronic data interchanges (EDIs). Bakos (1997) finds 
that B2B electronic marketplaces help reduce search costs and increase the ability of markets to optimally allocate 
resources. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2006) show that a move toward online B2B exchanges might trigger a wave of 
consolidation of higher-cost producers, resulting in a less fragmented industry. Kalvenes and Basu (2006) show that 
firms face serious tradeoffs between privacy and transparency. “Firms that set up electronic marketplaces to enhance 
their supply and/or distribution channels face challenges in attracting their competitors to participate” (Kalvenes and
Basu 2006, p. 1721). To deal with this issue, they propose a marketplace design to protect a trader’s identity. Banker 
et al. (2006) emphasize that IT facilitates buyers to economically monitor sellers’ performance, and B2B e-markets 
may lead to a greater degree of completeness of buyer-supplier contracts. Wang and Seidmann (1995) use a “one-
buyer, many-suppliers” EDI model to demonstrate that an additional supplier creates negative network externalities 
to other suppliers. To provide incentives for EDI adoption, the buyer should subsidize suppliers rather than mandate 
them to join an EDI network. While these prior papers study different aspects of B2B e-markets (or its 
predecessors), this paper focuses on a small piece of a large puzzle. We consider the value of information 
transparency for competing buyers, competing sellers and the total welfare of B2B e-markets while pervious 
literature generally considers one side (buyers or sellers) or assumes that one side is a monopoly.
Information sharing has been studied in the supply chain and economics literature in various settings. The supply 
chain literature has focused on sharing information on demand vertically with supply chain partners. This has been 
found beneficial as transparent information helps upstream and downstream partners to coordinate, and thus gains 
more efficiency for the supply chain by reducing bullwhip effects (Lee et al. 1997) and inventory costs (e.g., 
Gavirneni et al. 1999, Lee et al. 2000, Cachon and Fisher 2000). Yet, the literature generally assumes that either 
buyer or seller is a monopoly. Further, most studies focused on sharing demand information while cost information 
is the primary concern in our setting. This may bring different effects, as cost is a firm-specific, private parameter, 
while demand is an industry-wide common parameter (Gal-Or 1986). Comparing with this stream of literature, our 
paper considers a different two-level supply chain model where competition exists in both upstream and downstream 
Economics and Business Value of Information Systems
4 Twenty Eighth International Conference on Information Systems, Montreal 2007
industries, and firms are influenced by the horizontal effects of cost information rather than vertical effects of 
demand information.
The economics literature has studied horizontal information sharing about costs with competitors at a one-level
market. This is found to have mixed effects. It can make competing firms better or worse off. The net effects are 
found to be sensitive to the competition mode (Bertrand vs. Cournot), degree of product differentiation (substitute 
vs. complement), and the nature of the information (demand vs. cost) (e.g., Clarke 1983, Gal-Or 1985, 1986, 
Shapiro 1986, Vives 2002, Raith 1996). This stream of literature does not model a two-level B2B e-market where 
both manufacturers and retailers are affected by the information transparency. Thus, the effects of information 
transparency on upstream manufacturers and on the total B2B e-market remain unanswered in prior economics 
literature. In a two-level B2B e-market, both sides of manufacturers and retailers are important to the B2B e-market 
operator. The reason is that if any side is hurt and then leaves the B2B e-market, then the B2B e-market will not 
sustain any more. Our paper explicitly models both sides (manufacturers and retailers) in a B2B e-market and then 
shows a conflict of interests regarding information transparency between both sides. To our best knowledge, our 
B2B e-market model with two-sided competition is not considered in the prior economics literature.
More specifically, among these studies in the literature, Zhu (2004) examined the incentives of firms to join a 
transparent e-market. His model shows that such incentives are divided between high-cost firms and low-cost firms. 
We extend his model from a one-level e-market (where only informational effects on suppliers are considered) to a 
two-level supply chain which operates on a B2B e-market that provides a transaction platform and information hub 
(Lee and Whang 2000). Built on but going beyond Zhu (2004), our paper considers informational effects on 
manufacturers, retailers, and the total B2B e-market. We also analyze the optimal discriminatory pricing strategies 
for B2B e-market operator while Zhu did not consider such a pricing scheme.
To illustrate the major result without being burdened by mathematical complexity, we will present a simple base 
model first, followed by an analysis about the overall effects on the supply chain and differential effects on 
manufacturers and retailers. Then, we extend the base model to examine the informational effects when multiple 
manufacturers and multiple retailers are involved. Necessary technical proofs are provided in the appendix while 
some proofs that are relatively brief are presented in the main text.
2. The Base Model
Figure 1. The Base Model
To illustrate the essence of the issue, we first consider a simple two-level e-market with two retailers ( 1R  and 2R ) in 
downstream industry. Each retailer has two pre-qualified manufacturers in the upstream, where iR ’s manufacturers 
are labeled as iaM  and ibM ( )1,2i = . This simple setting captures two key features of B2B e-markets that are 
different from those of B2C e-markets. First, each retailer does business with a limited number of manufacturers. 
This is because the business-relation specific investments in B2B e-markets are significantly higher than those in 
B2C e-markets. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) argue that retailers often find it more profitable to work with only a 
small number of manufacturers when closer business relationships give manufacturers higher incentives to invest in 
their product quality, innovation and other noncontractible items. Second, each retailer chooses prequalified 
manufacturers before transactions. This is because transactions in B2B e-markets often involve mutual trust, 
1aM
1R
bids  (A)
1bM 2aM
2R
bids  (B)
2bM
B2B e-market
End-consumer market
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integrating interorganizational information systems, streamlining data exchanges, quality requirements, specification 
of product features, arrangements of shipments and payments. Typically a retailer needs to choose prequalified 
manufacturers that meet its requirements and trusted by it before inviting them to bid for contracts (Pinker et al. 
2003, Dai and Kauffman 2002). Thus, price is the last factor to be considered after screening potential business 
partners. In a B2C e-market, the transaction volume and the total price are small, such prequalification process is not 
critical to buyers. But in a B2B e-market, it is so risky to do business with non-prequalified suppliers that it is 
impractical to switch to a non-prequalitifed supplier in a short period of time.  For simplicity, we do not model 
complicated processes of a retailer’s decision of deciding optimal number of suppliers and choosing prequalified 
suppliers. Instead, our paper only focuses on the informational effects of information transparency. Built on prior 
B2B e-market literature (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993, Pinker et al. 2003, Dai and Kauffman 2002), we use the 
following assumptions to model the B2B e-market. 
Assumption 1: A retailer does business with a limited number of prequalified manufacturers.
The procurement cost reflects the retailer’s cost structure, which consists of procurement cost and other costs. To 
simplify exposition, we assume that the sum of all other costs for each retailer is a constant known to the industry 
and is normalized to zero. Manufacturers compete for contracts via the Vickrey second-bid auction. We make this 
assumption for two reasons. First, English auction is currently the dominant mechanism on the Internet (Pinker et al. 
2003). Second, the outcome of English auction can be achieved by the Vickrey auction (Milgrom 1989). And it is 
customary to model an English auction as a Vickery auction (Milgrom 1989).
The marginal cost of each manufacturer independently follows a uniform distribution ( )0,1U , which implies that 
manufacturers have a positive probability to win the bid. Apparently, a manufacturer will not be chosen as a 
retailer’s prequalified business partner if that manufacturer always lose the bid (i.e. the cost of that manufacturer is 
always higher than the costs of other manufacturers).
There are two possible informational schemes with the B2B e-market: transparent B2B e-market and opaque B2B e-
market. The design of a transparent B2B e-market is as follows. Both retailers can observe the participants and the 
winner’s bid of an auction. But they do not know who wins the bid. Such design has two advantages. First, it enables 
both retailers to share the information about their procurement costs (see Figure 1, the winner’s bid in auction A and 
auction B are visible to both retailers). Second, it does not disclose all information of a successful transaction and 
thus is acceptable to B2B e-market participants. 
If the e-market is run as an opaque platform, then each retailer’s procurement costs would remain as private 
information (manufacturer bids are visible to the corresponding retailer only, not to its competitor). In this case, 
retailers will need to estimate competitor’s cost based on available information. We explicitly express our 
assumption as follows. 
Assumption 2: The transparent B2B e-market enables retailers to share their cost information.
Retailers are engaged in Cournot competition with an inverse demand function from the end-consumer market,
1 2r rp d q q=   ,
where 
riq  is the quantity sold by retailer i ( )1,2i = , p is the price in consumer market, and d is the demand 
intercept. We assume that the products are perfect substitutes. To avoid degenerated solutions and to simplify the 
analysis, we follow prior literature (Li 2002) by assuming that the demand intercept is sufficiently large and that 
each manufacturer is able to fill the quantity ordered by the retailer. Also, all firms are risk-neutral.
3. The Effects of Information Transparency
Based on the above model setup, we study the effects of information transparency on retailers, manufacturers, and 
the total e-market participants respectively. Denote the cost of retailer i by 
ric ( )1,2i = , which equals to the second 
lowest bid that retailer i obtains from its pre-qualified manufacturers. According to the information structure of the 
e-market, 
ric  is revealed to retailer j ( )1,2;j j i=   in a transparent e-market but remains private in an opaque e-
market. 
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Transparent e-market
First, we analyze the transparent e-market. Retailer i’s problem is:
( ) ( )max
ri
ri ri ri rj ri riq
q d q q c q =     ( )1,2;i i j= 
where ( )ri riq , ric  and riq  are retailer i’s profit, cost and quantity, respectively. As discussed above, retailer i’s cost 
is observable to retailer j ( ), 1,2;i j i j=   through the e-market platform. Thus, retailer j may use ric  to compute 
riq , indicating that riq  is also known to retailer j by expectation. Solving the first-order condition and noting that the 
second-order condition is satisfied, we have:
( )13 2Tri ri rjq d c c=  + , ( )219 2Tri ri rjd c c =  + , 
where the superscript “T” stands for “transparent” market. 
Now consider the manufacturers, the strategic variable of a manufacturer is its bidding price. In a Vickrey auction 
with endogenous quantity, a manufacturer’s optimal bidding will truly reveal its marginal cost (Hansen 1988, 
Milgrom 1989). Thus, 
ric ( )1,2i =  is equivalent to the second-lowest manufacturer’s marginal cost, and follows a 
cumulative distribution function (CDF)1 ( ) ( ) 2Pr ric x F x x	 = = . It follows that ( ) 2f x x= , ( ) 2 3riE c = , and 
( )var 1 18ric = . Since the two retailers procure from different manufacturers, and the manufacturers’ marginal costs 
are independent of each other, we have ( )1 2cov , 0r rc c = . Then the retailer’s expected profit can be computed as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 5 19 9 162var 18 24 13Tri ri riE d E c c d d =  + =  +
   .
(1) 
Next we derive the total expected profit of all manufacturers. Apparently, the manufacturer who loses the bidding 
obtains zero profit. Now, consider 1R ’s manufacturers whose marginal costs are 1am  and 1bm . Without losing 
generality, we assume that 1 1b am m , meaning that 1aM  will win the order from 1R , and that 1 1r bc m= . The 
expected profit of 1aM  is
( )1 1 1( )T Tm r b aE E q m m 
 =    , 
where 1bm  is the price 1R  pays to 1aM , and 1am  is the marginal cost of 1aM . To derive ( )TmE  , we use the 
following results. First, ( ) ( )1 2 1 2cov , cov , 0a r b rm c m c= =  because 1am  and 1bm  are independent of 2rc . Second, the 
CDF of 1bm  is ( ) [ ]( )2 0,1F x x x=  , the conditional CDF of 1am , given 1bm , is ( )1 1b bH x m x m= [ ]( )10, bx m , 
and the CDF of 1am  is ( ) ( )21 1G x x=   . Using these results, we have
( )1 2 3bE m = , ( )1var 1 18bm = , ( )1 1 3aE m = , ( )1var 1 6am = , 
( ) ( ) ( )111 1 1 1 1 1 10 0cov , bma b a b a b bm m m m dH m m dF m=   ( ) ( )1 11 1 1 10 0 1 36b b a am dF m m dG m  =  ,
and thus
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1 23 3 32 3 cov , vara b bd m m m=   + 
   ( )154 6 5d=  .
(2) 
1
 There are two manufacturers. Thus, the probability that the second-lowest manufacturer marginal cost is lower 
than x is equivalent to the probability that the marginal costs of both manufacturers are lower than x. 
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By symmetry, the total profit of all participants in a transparent e-market is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 1 2812 2 9 3 1T T Tr r b aE E E q m m d d 
  = +   =    . 
(3) 
Opaque e-market
Now, we turn to the opaque B2B e-market. Retailer i’s problem is
( )max
ri
O
ri ri rj ri riq
E d q E q c q 
 
  =       , ( )1,2;i i j= 
where the superscript “O” stands for “opaque” market and E(qrj) is Ri’s expectation about Rj’s quantity (not directly 
observable to Ri). Solving the first-order condition yields ( )12O Ori rj riq d E q c
 =    .Retailers are rational, so it must 
follow that ( ) ( ) ( )12O Ori rj riE q d E q E c
 =    . By symmetry, ( ) ( )O Ori rjE q E q Eq= = , which leads to 
( )13 riEq d E c= 
   . Thus, 
( ) ( )1 16 182 3 6 9 2Ori ri ri riq d E c c d c= +  =  +
   , 
( ) ( )1324 6 9 2 6 9 9 4Ori ri rj ri ri ri ri rjd q q c q d c d c c 
 =    =  +  +   , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1324 4 6486 9 2 6 4 var 9 8 3 2Ori ri riE d E c d c d 
 =  +  + = + 
     . 
(4) 
Following a similar argument, we have
( ) ( )1 1 1 1216( ) 24 19O Om r b aE E q m m d 
 =   =    
(5) 
Then, the total profit of all participants in an opaque e-market is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 1 2812 2 9 3 2O O Or r b aE E E q m m d d 
  = +   =    . 
(6) 
Comparing (3) with (6), we find that ( ) ( )T OE E >  , which leads to the following result.
Proposition 1: The overall effect of information transparency on the whole B2B e-market is positive.
It is well known that vertical information sharing about demand creates value to a supply chain (e.g., Lee et al. 
2000). Here we obtain a consistent result, but in an expanded setting where competition exists in both upstream and 
downstream (both retailers and manufacturers face competition – none is a monopoly). Thus, our result, based on a 
B2B e-market that makes this feasible, brings additional insights into the value of information sharing (about costs) 
in a more realistic two-level supply chain setting.
Next we examine the effects of information transparency on retailers and manufacturers separately. The results we 
established earlier turn out to be quite useful. Comparing (1) with (4), and (2) with (5), we obtain: ( ) ( )T Om mE E < , 
and ( ) ( )T Ori riE E > , which lead to our next result:
Proposition 2: Information transparency benefits retailers but hurts manufacturers.
The intuition is as follows. When retailers engage in Cournot competition, information transparency helps them 
make more accurate decisions on quantity. For example, consider retailer i with ( )ri rjc E c> . If it is in a transparent 
e-market and retailer i finds that the realized 
rjc  is actually greater than ric , it would order more from its 
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manufacturers than otherwise if it is in an opaque market. Thus, a transparent market helps both retailers to 
coordinate their quantity strategies, leading to greater expected profit for both. 
Intuitively, manufacturers would take advantages of retailers if they make mistakes. Now, if the information 
transparency helps retailers better coordinate their strategies and reduce their miscalculations, manufacturers would 
be worse off. To see this, consider a manufacturer (say, 1aM ) who wins the bid. Its profit is ( )1 1 1r b aq m m  . 
Manufacturer 1aM  hopes that when 1bm  is large (or 1aM ’s profit margin ( )1 1b am m  is large), 1rq  is as large as 
possible. But in a transparent e-market, 1bm  tends to be more negatively associated with 1rq  than in an opaque 
market. This can be illustrated by
( )1 1cov , 1 27Tb rm q =  > ( )1 1cov , 1 36Ob rm q =  .
It means that a high-cost retailer is less likely to “incorrectly” order large quantity in a transparent e-market than in 
an opaque market. But such retailer’s mistake is desirable to manufacturers. Therefore, information transparency 
works against manufacturers. 
Propositions 1 and 2 offer important managerial implications to B2B e-market operators. The first business 
implication is that the B2B e-market operator should adopt a transparent B2B e-market. Second, the e-market 
operator also faces a managerial dilemma: i.e., how to reconcile these two opposing effects of information 
transparency on retailers and on manufacturers. Otherwise, manufacturers would not participate in the e-market. To 
resolve the incentive problem, we propose a discriminatory pricing scheme for the e-market operator to redistribute 
informational benefits among retailers and manufacturers to make both sides better off. Denote by 
rif  the fees 
charged to retailer i by the B2B e-market operator. And denote by 
mif  the fees charged to the manufacturer who 
wins retailer i’s order. We describe the B2B e-market operator’s problem as follows.
( )2
, 1
max
ri mi
ri mif f i
f f
=
+
(7) 
s.t. ( ) ( )T Ori ri riE f E    and ( ) ( )T Omi mi miE f E    
The constraints of e-market operator’s problem ensure that both retailers and manufacturers are at least indifferent 
between a transparent B2B e-market and an opaque B2B e-market. Otherwise either retailers or manufacturers 
would leave the transparent B2B e-market and thus the e-market is not sustainable any more. The optimal strategy of 
the B2B e-market operator is straightforward and is summarized in the following Proposition. 
Corollary 1: The B2B e-market operator should adopt a transparent e-market mechanism, charge( ) ( )T Ori ri rif E E =   on retailers and ( ) ( )T Omi mi mif E E =  on winning manufacturers.
rif  is the maximum fees can be charged on retailers while mif  is the minimum compensations  given to 
manufacturers in order to retain them in the B2B e-market. Apparently, 
rif  and mif  given in Corollary 1 is the 
optimal strategy of the B2B e-market operator. Given 0
ri rmf f+ > , the discriminatory pricing scheme is feasible 
and is profitable to the B2B e-market operator. Even though information transparency might hurt one side, the losses 
of this side could be compensated by the gains of the other side. In such a case, charging a transaction fee on one 
side and subsidizing the other side may help internalize incentives of both sides.
4. Bertrand Competition in Downstream Industry
The above analysis assumes that retailers compete on quantity. In this section, we consider the case where retailers 
compete on price (Bertrand competition). Retailer i’s demand function is
ri ri rjq d p p=  + ,   ( ), 1,2;i j i j=  ,
where 
rip , the price charged by retailer i, is retailer i’s strategic variable. Using a similar argument as that in the 
previous section, we proceed to obtain the following results.
In a transparent e-market, 
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( )13 3 2Tri ri rjp d c c= + + ,  ( )13 3Tri ri rjq d c c=  + ,  ( )219 3Tri ri rjd c c =  + ,
( ) ( )2 22 19 81varTri riE d c d = + = + , 
(8) 
( ) ( )1 1 11 1 1 13 3 3 108( ) var cov ,Tm b a bE d m m m d =   = 
   ,
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1 1 1 2 13 1622 2 2T T Tr r b aE E E q m m d d 
  = +   = + +   
(10)
Similarly, in an opaque market, 
( )16 6 3 2Ori rip d c= + + , ( )12 2Ori ri rjq d c c=  + , ( ) ( )112 2 6 3 2Ori ri rj rid c c d c =  +  + ,
( ) ( )2 21 14 72varOri riE d c d = + = + , 
(11)
( ) ( )1 1 11 1 1 13 2 3 72( ) var cov ,Om b a bE d m m m d =   = 
   ,
(12) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1 1 1 232 2 2O O Or r b aE E E q m m d d 
  = +   = +  .
(13)
Comparing (10) with (13), (9) with (12), and (8) with (11), we have the following result:
Proposition 3: If downstream retailers engage in price competition, the overall effect of information transparency 
on the total B2B e-market is still positive. But information transparency hurts retailers while benefits 
manufacturers.
Recall that information transparency benefits retailers when they compete on quantity, but here information 
transparency turns to be against them under Bertrand competition. To the best of our knowledge, prior literature did 
not consider competing manufacturers in the upstream. Hence, it is worthwhile to explain the effects. Information 
transparency tends to intensify price competition (Zhu 2004). That is, price competition is more intense when firms 
know each other’s costs. On average, the prices the retailers charge will be lower with information transparency, 
which leads to lower profit for the retailers. However, since lower prices means higher demand, the manufacturers 
can sell a greater quantity under information transparency, which leads to greater profits for the manufacturers.
Comparison with Prior Economics Literature
To the best of our knowledge, prior economics literature of information sharing did not considered a two-level B2B 
e-market model with competing retailers in downstream and competing manufacturers in upstream. Instead, prior 
economics literature only focused on the informational effects in a one-level market without upstream industry. 
Thus, prior economics literature did not answer two important questions face by B2B e-market operators: (1) Is it 
worthwhile for the B2B e-market operator to pursue the information transparency? and (2) If so, will both sides of 
buyers and sellers be better off with information transparency? If any side is hurt, then which side is hurt, under 
what conditions? Our paper answers these questions based on a two-level e-market model different from those used 
in prior economics literature.
Conflict of Interest Regarding Information Transparency
As a quick summary of the analysis so far, we have found that the effect of information transparency on 
manufacturers is always opposite to the effect on retailers. It means that information transparency can always benefit 
one side, but at the cost of the other side. That is,
Corollary 2: Information transparency always hurts one side (either retailers or manufacturers), indicating an 
inherent conflict of interest regarding information transparency. The competition mode in the downstream industry 
determines which side will be hurt. 
Table 1. The Differential Effects of Information Transparency
Economics and Business Value of Information Systems
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Downstream Competition Retailers Manufacturers Overall Effects
Cournot + - +
Bertrand - + +
Table 1 summarizes the effects of information transparency. Although greater information transparency benefits the 
total supply chain (Proposition 1), the informational benefit to one side always comes at a price to the other side. 
Such conflict of interest would have serious consequences. Those who are hurt would not participate in the e-
market, which in turn will make the e-market not sustainable. This illustrates a fundamental challenge facing supply 
chain management. It also provides a possible theoretical explanation of the difficulty of B2B e-markets in 
industries (CIO 2002).
Since the total effect of information transparency is always positive, it follows that, regardless the competition mode 
in the downstream industry, the B2B e-market operator may always use the discriminatory pricing scheme proposed 
in Corollary 1 to reconcile the conflict of interest between the two sides.
5. Extensions
We will extend the base model in several dimensions in this section. We will see that the simple base model is in 
fact able to demonstrate the major result, while the extended model confirms its robustness.
5.1 Asymmetric Case
The base model above assumes that each of the two retailers has two pre-qualified manufacturers. Now, we relax 
this assumption by allowing iR  to have ik  pre-qualified manufacturers, and without losing generality, let 
2 1 2k k  . We still assume two retailers for now. Following a similar process as above, we get:
( )13 2Tri ri rjq d c c=  + ,  and  ( )16 2 3Ori ri riq d E c c= + 
   . 
Denote by 1lim  the lowest marginal cost of iR ’s manufacturers, and 
2l
im  the second lowest (note that 2lri ic m= ). 
Then the total expected profit of iR ’s manufacturers is ( )2 1b l lri i iE q m m
   ( )or b T O= . The following results are 
established (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 1: ( ) ( )1 1 1li iE m k= + , ( ) ( )2 2 1li iE m k= + , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22var 2 1 1 2li i i im k k k
 =  + +  , 
( )1 2cov ,l li im m ( ) ( ) ( )21 2 1i i ik k k
 =  + +  .
Using these results and the expression of T
riq  and 
O
riq , we derive the expected retailer profit and manufacturer profits 
as in the Appendix. It follows that:
( ) ( ) 0T Ori ri riE E     > , ( ) ( ) 0T Om m miE E     < , and ( ) ( ) 0T OE E     > .
This means that information transparency benefits the total B2B e-market. But it hurts manufacturers while benefits 
retailers. The B2B e-market operator may use a discriminatory pricing scheme to internalize the conflict of interest. 
Hence, the result established earlier with the simple base model carries over to a setting when more manufacturers 
are involved. The highest possible price charged to retailer i is 
ri  while the lowest compensation to the wining 
manufacturer is 
mi . Since 2 1 2k k   and ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 2k k k
  + +   is a decreasing function in 2k  , k N , it 
is straightforward to show that 1 2r r    , 1 2m m    , and thus we have:
Proposition 4: In a transparent e-market, the market operator may charge a lower price to a retailer who has 
more manufacturers than its competitor. That retailer’s wining manufacturer should get less compensation than 
the other retailer’s wining manufacturer. 
It is important to understand how the discriminatory pricing scheme would work. When both retailers have different 
numbers of pre-qualified manufacturers, they should be charged differently. Proposition 4 provides a guideline of 
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discriminatory pricing to the e-market operators. Given 2 1 2k k  , it can be shown that ( ) ( )2 1var varr rc c	 , 
indicating that it is easier for 1R  to “guess” 2R ’s cost than it is for 2R  to “guess” 1R ’s cost in an opaque market. So 
it might seem intuitive that information transparency should bring about lower benefits to 1R  than to 2R . But 
counter-intuitively, the above proposition suggests that information transparency benefits 1R  more than 2R . The key 
reason is that the major benefit of information transparency to 1R  is not uncertainty reduction, but how competition 
is affected by information transparency. As discussed earlier, information transparency tends to help Cournot 
retailers coordinate their quantity strategies rather than intensify the overall competition. Since 2 1 2k k  , 2R  is 
more likely to obtain a lower procurement price than 1R , and is thus more competitive than 1R . Intuitively, 
information transparency reduces 1R ’s cost uncertainty in 2R ’s eyes, and makes 2R  less aggressive than otherwise 
in an opaque market. And this is the key source of informational benefits to 1R . Given the fact that 2R  is stronger 
than 1R  in terms of cost advantage, a reduction of aggressiveness of 2R  is certainly more valuable to 1R  than a 
reduction of aggressiveness of 1R  to 2R , all else being equal. 
As shown above, information transparency makes manufacturers worse off because a high-cost retailer in a 
transparent e-market is less likely to “incorrectly” order large quantity than in an opaque market. Note that 1R  is 
more likely to be a higher-cost retailer comparing to 2R . It suggests that the negative effect of information 
transparency would have a stronger impact on 1R ’s wining manufacturer than on 2R ’s wining manufacturer. That is 
why 1R ’s wining manufacturer should get more compensation. 
5.2 Many-to-Many B2B E-Market
So far we have considered two retailers only in the downstream industry. Now, we extend the analysis to a more 
general setting with n  retailers, each of them having k pre-qualified manufacturers ( , 2n k  , ,n k N ). Retailer i’s 
problem in a transparent B2B e-market is:
( )max
ri
ri ri ri rj ri riq j i
q d q q c q

 =      , ( ), 1...i j n= .
Solving this problem, and noting that retailer i knows 
rjc  (and thus rjq ), we get 
1
1
T
ri ri rj
j i
q d nc c
n 
 =  + +   . 
(14)
In parallel, retailer i’s problem in an opaque market is:
( )max
ri
ri ri ri rj ri riq j i
E q d q E q c q


  =   
   !    !   ( ), 1...i j n= .
Solving this problem, and noting that ( ) ( ) ( )ri rjE q E q i j=   at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
2 2 1
iO
ri
d c n d Ec
q
n
  =  +
(15)
where ( ) ( )1...riEc E c i n= = . Using (14), (15), and the results in Lemma 1, we have
( ) ( ) 0T Ori ri rE E     > , ( ) ( ) 0T Om m mE E     < , ( ) ( ) 0T OE E     > .
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This result is the same as that in Table 1. This shows that our major result is quite robust to model specifications. 
Further, it can be shown that 
r
 , 
m
 , and   are increasing functions of n  and decreasing functions of k . 
Noting that n  and k  measure the intensity of competition in downstream and upstream respectively, we have:
Proposition 5: The value of information transparency to the total B2B e-market (  ), to a retailer (
r
 ), and 
the minimum compensation given to the wining manufacturer (
m
 ) increase with respect to the intensity of the 
downstream competition (n), but decrease with respect to the intensity of the upstream competition (k).
If the downstream industry has a greater number of retailers (n is large), it is more difficult for them to coordinate 
their quantity strategies (without the e-market). Given that the major benefit of information transparency is to help 
retailers coordinate their quantities, it follows that information transparency should be more valuable to retailers 
when n is larger. This also implies the following prediction:
Corollary 3: A transparent B2B e-market would work better in a market with a fragmented downstream industry 
where information-based coordination is more valuable.
Now, consider the manufacturers. As we have seen, if one side of the e-market obtains more efficiency, it comes 
with the expense of the other side. So it is not surprising to find that the wining manufacturer suffers a greater loss 
from information transparency when n is larger. Then the compensation to the manufacturer should go up in order to 
make the e-market sustainable. In contrast, when k is larger, the uncertainty of 
ric  is smaller because ( )var ric  is a 
decreasing function of k. Consequently, the informational benefits to eliminate or lower uncertainty turn to be 
smaller.
5.3 Sealed Auction
In this subsection, the B2B e-market structure is the same as the base model (see Figure 1). The difference is that the 
upstream manufacturers compete for the downstream retailer order via a sealed auction (or first-bid auction) rather 
than an open auction (or second-bid auction). Although this case is not a common practice, we examine it because 
information transparency will have a direct effect on manufacturers, whereas manufacturers are indirectly affected 
by information transparency. 2
We want to examine whether the major results still hold in this special cases. The problem of a manufacturer turns 
out to be an optimal bidding strategy with endogenous quantity. Hansen (1988) has analyzed a simple model with 
one-level market and linear demand function. It is generally infeasible to get an analytical solution for the 
manufacturer’s bidding strategy even under a simple setting (Hansen 1998). Following the method used in Hansen 
(1988), we have obtained the following results. In a transparent B2B e-market, the manufacturer’s optimal bidding 
strategy ( )T ib m  satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 4
T T TT
r i i ii
T T
i i i r i
d E c b m b m md b m
dm m m d E c b m

  
 +  
      = 
  + +  
,
where ( ) ( ) ( )1
0
2 1T T
r
E c m b m dm=  . In an opaque B2B e-market, the manufacturer’s optimal bidding strategy 
( )O ib m  turns to satisfy
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 3
1 3 2 6
O O OO
r i i ii
O O
i i i r i
d E c b m b m md b m
dm m m d E c b m

  
 +  
      = 
  + +  
, 
2
 In the base model, the optimal bidding strategy of a manufacturer remains the same in a transparency B2B e-
market and an opaque B2B e-market. So manufacturers are indirectly affected by information transparency via the 
qualities chosen by retailers. But if manufacturers compete for downstream orders via a sealed auction, then their 
bidding strategies are different in opaque and transparent B2B e-market. Information transparency will have a direct 
effect on manufacturers. 
Zhou and Zhu / Conflict of Interest Regarding Information Transparency in B2B e-Market
Twenty Eighth International Conference on Information Systems, Montreal 2007 13
where ( ) ( ) ( )1
0
2 1O O
r
E c m b m dm=  . It is infeasible to obtain the analytical results for ( )T ib m  and ( )O ib m . 
We have conducted numerical experiments and found that our results in Table 1 still hold. The Mathematica 
program of numerical experiments is available upon request from authors.
6. Closing Remarks
This paper considers information transparency in a two-level business-to-business electronic market with 
competition existing in both upstream and downstream. We find that information transparency enabled by the e-
market benefits the total B2B e-market no matter the downstream competition mode is Cournot competition or 
Bertrand competition. Prior supply chain management literature has shown that information sharing about demand 
benefits the total supply chain. In this paper, we consider a two-level B2B e-market model that different from prior 
supply chain literature. First, our result is obtained in an expanded setting in which we take competition into account 
(where the informational benefits would have to be divided among multiple players). Second, information 
transparency in this paper refers to transparency about competitor’s cost rather than the demand. Thus this paper 
takes one step further toward understanding the important but subtle effects of information sharing on supply chains.
Although information transparency benefits the total B2B e-market, the effect on each one side is always in conflict 
with the other side. Surprisingly, we find that it is always the case that one side (either manufacturers or retailers) 
will be hurt; conflict of interest persists. Those who are hurt by information transparency would have little incentive 
to participate in the e-market. This illustrates a fundamental challenge facing B2B e-market management. It also 
provides a possible theoretical explanation of the reluctance of many suppliers and manufacturers to join B2B e-
markets in several industries (CIO 2002). Our theoretical prediction seems to be supported by a recent empirical 
study conducted by Soh et. al. (2006) that shows that buyers and sellers have conflicting interests regarding price 
transparency.
To encourage participation in information sharing when informational rents are not evenly distributed, several 
studies in the literature proposed contract schemes. Alternatively, we propose a market-based approach, that is, the 
e-market operator may use a discriminatory pricing scheme to internalize the conflict of interest between retailers 
and manufacturers so as to ensure participation incentives from both sides.
Our theoretical results might have some managerial implications. The conflict of interest is found to be a serious 
issue with regard to incentives of information sharing in B2B e-market. One possible way out of this dilemma is that 
a pricing scheme should be carefully designed to make both sides better off with information transparency. 
Otherwise either manufacturers or retailers would not participate in the e-market. Any theoretical value of 
information transparency will not materialize. The discriminatory pricing scheme proposed by this paper may help 
align incentives and achieve coordination. Such an approach might work better than the contract scheme proposed in 
earlier literature for two reasons. First, the B2B e-market is an intermediary that is not motivated to manipulate the 
information to be revealed, and thus is more likely to be trusted by both sellers and buyers, while contractors who 
pre-commit information sharing still have incentives to cheat by providing incorrect information to others. Second, 
our approach is a less costly method to achieve coordination among many players while developing a contact for so 
many players might turn out to be infeasible.
Finally, this paper offers important managerial insights about the value of information transparency. We have shown 
informational effects under various settings. These results are useful guidelines to design and manage electronic 
markets.
This paper leaves several issues open for further research. First, this study has not taken consumer welfare into 
account. How would the social welfare (the total welfare of supply chain plus consumers) be affected by information 
sharing? Second, our simple two-level B2B e-market model can be used to study not only information transparency 
but also other interesting issues such as the effects of inter-organizational IT system integration and business partner
selections. Finally, empirical studies may help test the theoretical results in either a real-world or an experimental 
setting. These questions are left for further analysis. We hope that the initial results reported above will motivate 
more research in this area.
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Appendix
Asymmetric Case (Lemma 1)
Recall that 1lim  is the lowest marginal cost among ik  manufacturers. Then,
( ) ( )1, Pr li iG x k m x= 	 ( ) ( )1 Pr all manufacturers' costs 1 1 ikx x=  > =   ,
and thus ( ) ( )1 1 1li iE m k= + . Consider 2lim , the second lowest marginal costs among ik  manufacturers, 
( )2Pr lim x	 = ( ) ( )1 Pr all manufacturers' costs Pr only one manufacturer's cost x x >  	
( ) ( ) ( ) 1, 1 1 1i ik ki iF x k x k x x = =      , 
and thus ( ) ( )2 2 1li iE m k= + , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22var 2 1 1 2li i i im k k k
 =  + +  . 
The conditional CDF of 1lim , given 
2l
im , is 
( )2 2l li iH x m x m= ( )20, lix m
   .
Hence,
( ) ( ) ( )212 1 2 1 1 2 20 0 ,liml l l l l l li i i i i i i iE m m m m dH m m dF m k =   ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 1 2 1 2
1
cov ,
2 1
l l l l l l i
i i i i i i
i i
k
m m E m m E m E m
k k
=    = + + . 
Asymmetric Case (Proposition 4)
Using the results in Lemma 1 and the expression of T
riq  and 
O
riq , we derive the expected retailer profit and 
manufacturer profits as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 1 8 11 4 2
9 1 1 9 1 29 1 2
j iT
ri
i j i ij j
k k
E d
k k k kk k
 
   =  + + + !+ + + + ! + + 
, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 1
2 2
2 11 4 2( )
9 1 11 3 1 2
iT T l l
m ri i i
i ji i i
k
E E q m m d
k kk k k
 
  
 =   =  +  !  + ++ + + ! 
, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 11 4 2
9 1 1 2 1 2
iO
ri
i j i i
k
E d
k k k k
 
  =  + + !+ + + + ! 
, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 1
2 2
11 4 2( )
9 1 11 2 1 2
iO O l l
m ri i i
i ji i i
k
E E q m m d
k kk k k
 
  
 =   =  +  !  + ++ + + ! 
,
It follows that:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )2 2
4 17 11 0
18 1 2 1 2
jiT O
ri ri ri
i i j j
kk
E E
k k k k
  

  !   = + > !+ + + + 
,
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( )
( ) ( )2
1( ) ( ) 0
6 1 2
iT O
m m mi
i i
k
E E
k k
      =  <+ + ,  and
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 22 21 1 2 2
1 14 0
9 1 2 1 2
T O k kE E
k k k k

       = + > !+ + + + !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